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Civil Rights Crimes and the Federal Power To
Punish Private Individuals for Interference
With Federally Secured Rights.
Howard M. Feuerstein*
The increasing interest in civil rights today has made apparent the
need for federal protection of those rights from private interference.
In this article, Mr. Fenerstein focuses on present and proposed federal
remedies in this area through an examination of the relevant statutory
and case law, and concludes that Congress must enact legislation
specifically enumerating the prohibited conduct.
I. INTRODUCTION
Participants in the current civil rights movement in the South have
been subjected to countless acts of violence and intimidation com-
mitted by private individuals acting either on their own or as part
of racist organizations. As a result of such acts of violence, new
legislation has been introduced in Congress.' Yet, the federal system
historically has placed strict limitations on the power of the national
government to deal with the acts of private individuals. The time is
therefore ripe for a re-examination of these limitations. In so doing,
this article deals with acts of private individuals in the technical
sense of persons not acting under color of law.
The starting point for any such study is section 241 of title 18 of
the United States Code. That statute, enacted during the Reconstruc-
tion era, is the key to determining the need and permissible scope of
future legislation. It has helped define those constitutional rights
which the national government may protect from private interference;
and through its own weaknesses, it has pointed the way toward legis-
lative reform.
The present section 241 provides:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimi-
date any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege
*LL.B. Vanderbilt University, 1963; Member, Oregon and Tennessee Bars; Associate,
Davies, Biggs, Strayer, Stoel & Bole,, Portland, Oregon; former Editor-in-Chief,
Vanderbilt Law Review, 1962-63; Teaching Fellow, Stanford Law School 1964-65. The
author wishes to thank Professor Robert Girard of Stanford Law School and Barnes H.
Ellis of the Oregon Bar for their help and advice in the preparation of this article.
1. S. 2923, H.R. 13323, H.R. 14765, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
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secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because
of his having so exercised the same; or
If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises
of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment
of any right or privilege so secured-
They shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than
ten years, or both.
Congress has made only minor changes in this section since it was
originally enacted as section 6 of the Act of May 31, 1870.2
Three statutory limitations to the coverage of section 241 are
immediately apparent: First, the section deals only with conspiracies;
thus, acts of single individuals are not crimes under this section, and
the section does not make a crime of the consummation of the object
of the conspiracy. Second, the victim of the conspiracy must have
been a citizen of the United States.3 And, third, since the section is a
conspiracy statute, it necessarily includes the element of specific intent
to deprive a person of a federal right made definite by decision or
other rule of law-thereby saving the statute from challenge on the
ground of undue vagueness.4 Beyond these limitations the statute
covers infringements of all rights which are secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws of the United States and which are within the power
of Congress to protect from private interference by criminal legisla-
tion.5 Since the statute's coverage is cast in terms of constitutional
reference, there is no doubt that it is constitutionally valid.6
2. Ch. 114, 16 Stat. 141, as amended, 18 U.S.C. 241 (1964): "Sec. 6. And be it
further enacted, That if two or more persons shall band or conspire together, or go
in disguise upon the public highway, or upon the premises of another, with intent to
violate any provision of this, or to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen
with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise and enjoyment of any right or
privilege granted or secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States,
or because of his having exercised the same, such persons shall be held guilty of felony,
and, on conviction thereof, shall be fined or imprisoned, or both, at the discretion
of the court,-the fine not to exceed five thousand dollars, and the imprisonment not
to exceed ten years,-and shall, moreover, be thereafter ineligible to, and disabled
from holding, any office or place of honor, profit, or trust created by the Constitution
or laws of the United States."
The changes in the section are conveniently traced in a chart which is included as
an appendix to the opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in United States v. Williams,
341 U.S. 70, 83 (1951), and the congressional debates are attached as an appendix
to the Court's opinion in United States v. Price, 86 Sup. Ct. 1152, 1163-70 (1966).
None of the changes reflect a substantive change in the coverage of the section. See
United States v. Williams, supra at 79. For convenience, all of the predecessor sec-
tions will be hereinafter referred to as "section 241," unless otherwise indicated.
3. Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887).
4. See United States v. Guest, 86 Sup. Ct. 1170, 1175-76, 1193 (1966); United
States v. Price, 86 Sup. Ct. 1152, 1163 n.20 (1966); United States v. Williams, supra
note 2, at 93-95 (dissenting opinion). Cf. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
5. See United States v. Price, 86 Sup. Ct. 1152 (1966) rejecting United States v.
Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 71 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
6. See United States v. Price, 86 Sup. Ct. 1152, 1154 n.2 (1966); Motes v. United
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II. ThE IMPLIED POWER OF GOVERNMENTAL SELF-PROTECTION
The doctrine of implied or necessary and proper powers is firmly
established in our constitutional law.7 Indeed, it is largely responsible
for the continuing vitality of the Constitution. Nowhere in the
Constitution are any express rights given to individuals with a cor-
responding express power in Congress to pass criminal legislation in
order to protect these rights from private interference. But the
Constitution may well give an express right with an implied power
in Congress to protect the right; or the Constitution may give an
implied right with a corresponding implied power to protect that
right. Moreover, the doctrine of "resulting powers" or "aggregate
powers" states that an implied right or power need not be traceable
to a particular one of the specified powers, but may be traced to
more than one or all of the express powers combined.8 These basic
rules have served as a foundation for the use of section 241. The
cases discussed below illustrate the role played by the implied power
of governmental self-protection in the development of that section.
A. Protection of Federal Prisoners
In Logan v. United States,9 the defendants were charged with a
conspiracy in violation of section 241 to murder citizens who were
prisoners in the custody of a United States marshal. The victims were
being held for trial on a federal charge of larceny on an Indian
reservation. While the victims were being transported to another
jail by a deputy marshal and his assistants, the defendants attacked
and killed some of the prisoners. Although there was evidence that
a few of the guards may have been in collusion with the defendants,
the indictment did not allege any such cooperation, nor did it allege
that the defendants acted under color of law.
Although the Supreme Court reversed the convictions on procedural
grounds, it held that the crime alleged in the indictment is within
the reach of the constitutional powers of the United States and is
covered by section 241. The Court observed that the necessary and
proper clause of the Constitution0 gives Congress the power to
provide for punishment of all crimes and offenses against the United
States and, to accomplish this end, the power to enact laws for the
States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900); United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76 (1884); Ex parte
Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
7. The leading case is McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
See also Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
8. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 534-35 (1871). Compare Prigg
v. Pennsylvania, supra note 7.
9. 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
1966 ]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
arrest and commitment of those accused of such crimes." Having the
power to hold such prisoners, the Court reasoned, the United States
has an equal duty to protect them from any assault or injury while so
held. Further, the existence of that duty necessarily implies a cor-
responding right of the prisoners to be so protected, a right which is
secured to them by the Constitution and laws of the United States.12
Having found that there was a right to protection, the Court con-
cluded that Congress had the power to pass criminal legislation to
protect this right from interference by private individuals. The Court
said:
[E]very right, created by, arising under or dependent upon, the Constitu-
tion of the United States, may be protected and enforced by Congress by
such means and in such manner as Congress, in the exercise of the cor-
relative duty of protection, or the legislative powers conferred upon it by
the Constitution, may in its discretion deem most eligible and best adapted
to attain the object.' 3
The Court, however, distinguished these rights from those which
are "recognized and declared, but not granted or created" in some
of the amendments and which are "thereby guaranteed only against
violation or abridgement by the United States, or by the States, as the
case may be, and cannot therefore be affirmatively enforced by
Congress against unlawful acts of individuals."14 In Logan, the
prisoners' right did not depend upon any of the amendments, but
arose "out of the creation and establishment by the Constitution itself
of a national government, paramount and supreme within its sphere
of action." 5 Any government which has the power to indict, try,
and punish for crime; and to arrest the accused and hold him in
safekeeping until trial, must have the duty and power to protect
him against unlawful interference.
Logan is a good example of the conceptual problems faced by a
court when it tries to apply section 241. If the Constitution grants the
national government penal powers,'16 clearly Congress has the power
to pass laws protecting these penal functions. Because the necessary
and proper clause confers upon the government the power of self-
11. 144 U.S. at 283-84.
12. Id. at 284.
13. Id. at 293.
14. Ibid. But is not any right which is "recognized and declared" also "granted"
by the Constitution? It is difficult to see why the Court's reasoning in Logan would
not apply to duties of protection imposed on the states by the fourteenth amendment.
See text accompanying note 189 infra.
15. Id. at 294.
16. The Legal Tender Cases, supra note 8, at 537 mentioned the penal powers as
an example of a resulting power.
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preservation, or self-protection,? the government may legislate to
protect all its institutions and lawful functions from interference.
But section 241 requires more than a showing of federal power
to legislate. To come within the section, the victim must have been
exercising a federally secured right. To find such a right in Logan,
the Court had to imply it from a governmental duty to protect the
prisoner, which was in turn implied from the penal power. Since the
opinion in Logan suggests that the section may be invoked regardless
of the degree of care exercised by the government, 8 it might be
more accurate to say that the prisoner's right is a right to be safe
from governmental and private action while in custody, rather than
merely a right to be reasonably protected by the Government. Never-
theless, it seems doubtful that such a broad right can be implied
from the mere duty of the Government to protect the prisoner. More
logically, this duty would only give rise to a right in the prisoner
as against the Government-a right to be protected. Private individuals
could not interfere with this right, unless they acted in concert with
the Government.
Thus, while Logan is clearly sound insofar as it applies the implied
power of governmental self-protection, its finding of an exercise of
that power in section 241 as to the safety of federal prisoners is ques-
tionable.
B. Protection of Federal Officers and judges
In re Neagle19 involved state authority to prosecute a federal
officer for killing a man who had tried to assault a federal judge. The
Supreme Court observed that an act of violence against a federal
judge while he is executing the laws of the United States is a breach
of the peace of the United States; thus, there is a duty on the
executive branch to protect federal judges from these dangers. Two
years later in Logan the Court reiterated this duty and added that the
United States is bound to protect "all persons in their service or
custody in the course of the administration of justice."0 Using the
Logan approach, it would follow by implication that conspiracies to
perform acts of violence or intimidation against these officers would
be violations of section 241, and the lower courts have so held.
21
The same reasoning leads to the conclusion that all federal officers
17. Id. at 533-34.
18. Cf. 144 U.S. at 285.
19. 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
20. 144 U.S. at 295.
21. United States v. Davis, 103 Fed. 457 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1900), aff'd, 107 Fed.
753 (6th Cir. 1901); see United States v. Patrick, 54 Fed. 338 (C.C.M.D. Tenn.
1893); c. McDonald v. United States, 9 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1925).
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are protected by section 241 while exercising their official duties.22
Their right to be protected is implied from the governmental duty to
protect them, which is in turn implied from the express or implied
power which authorized the creation of the office. The power of
Congress to protect these officers comes from the implied power of
self-protection.
Again, it is doubtful that the right to be protected could be
interfered with by private individuals. A better analysis would be
to say that federal officers have a federal right to carry out their
official duties, and anyone interfering with these duties infringes that
right.
Section 372 of the criminal code specifically makes conspiring to
impede or injure federal officers a crime.23 This section, originally
passed in 1861, has a maximum penalty of six years or 5,000 dollars,
or both, compared to the 10 years, 5,000 dollars penalty in section 241.
C. Federal Informers
The defendants in In re Quarles & Butler24 were convicted of
violating section 241 by conspiring to assault, beat, and kill a citizen
for having informed a United States deputy marshal that certain
persons were running an illegal distillery. In denying the writ of
habeas corpus, the Supreme Court held that it is the right and duty
of every citizen to communicate to the executive officers any informa-
tion he has of the commission of an offense against the laws of the
United States. Relying on Logan, the Court concluded that the right
to protection of an informer or a prisoner in custody are privileges
and immunities "arising out of the nature and essential character of
the national government, and granted or secured by the Constitu-
tion."2s
It would be more accurate to say that the right is a right to inform,
which arises from the creation of law enforcement machinery. The
power to legislate, however, is implied from the nature and essential
character of the national government-from its need to protect its
functions. It is doubtful that the right of informers is peculiar to
those informers who are citizens. Citizenship is only significant insofar
as section 241 imposes this limitation in its exercise of congressional
power.
22. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 659-62 (1884) stated by way of dictum that
Congress has the implied power and duty to protect federal officers while performing
their services. State officers performing federally imposed duties are similarly protected.
See Brewer v. Horde School Dist., 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956), discussed in text
accompanying notes 159-61 infra.
23. 18 U.S.C. § 372 (1964).
24. 158 U.S. 532 (1895).
25. Id. at 536.
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Five years after the decision in Quarles, the Supreme Court again
had the same issue before it in Motes v. United States.26 Without
citing Quarles the Court held that it was the right of the informer,
"in return for the protection he enjoyed under the Constitution and
laws of the United States, to aid in the execution of the laws of his
country by giving information to the proper authorities of violations
of those laws."27
D. Federal Litigants and Witnesses
In Terral v. Burke Construction Co.,28 the Supreme Court struck
down a state statute as an interference with the right of: a citizen of
one state to resort to the federal courts of another state,2 9 this right
being secured under the judicial power of the United States30 and
section one of the fourteenth amendment. In 1890, a lower federal
court upheld an indictment which charged a violation of section 241
for conspiring to prevent a litigant from applying to a federal court for
a contempt order.31 The court held that whenever a party has a right
to litigate in the federal courts, he is exercising a right secured to him
by the Constitution and laws of the United States.1 In addition,
the Ninth Circuit held in Foss v. United States3 that this section also
applies to a conspiracy to prevent a witness from testifying before
a United States Commissioner.3
The rights to invoke the federal courts and to testify in federal
litigation are clearly implied from the exercise of the judicial power
granted in article III. No one would question the power of Congress
to protect these rights under the implied power of self-protection.
Section 241, however, appears to overlap with the present federal




The thirteen amendment prohibition against involuntary servitude
clearly applies to private individuals not acting under color of law.36
26. 178 U.S. 458 (1900).
27. Id. at 462-63; accord, Nicholson v. United States, 79 F.2d 387 (8th Cir. 1935).
28. 257 U.S. 529 (1922).
29. See Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35,44 (1867) (dictum).
30. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.
31. United States v. Lancaster, 44 Fed. 885 (C.C.W.D. Ga. 1890).
32. Id. at 892-93, citing U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
33. 266 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1920).
34. The court rejected United States v. Sanges, 48 Fed. 78 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1891),
appeal dismissed, 144 U.S. 310 (1892), which was contra, as being inconsistent with
Logan and Motes.
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1964). The maximum penalty under section 1503 is $5,000,
5 years, or both.
36. See, e.g., United States v. Gaskin, 320 U.S. 527 (1944); Clyatt v. United States,
197 U.S. 207 (1905).
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Section 241 has been used in an involuntary servitude case on the
theory that the right against enforced compulsory service is guaranteed
by the thirteenth amendment.37 Most prosecutions, however, are now
brought under the peonage and slavery statutes.38
F. Furnishing War Supplies
In 1920, two federal courts of appeal reached opposite conclusions
as to whether it is a violation of section 241 to conspire to prevent
producers from fulfilling their contracts with the government to
furnish munitions, ships, and supplies for war purposes.39 In neither
case was the discussion particularly enlightening. Clearly there is
federal power to protect such suppliers, but it is questionable whether
they are exercising a right secured by the Constitution or laws of
the United States. Nevertheless, an analogy might be made to the
right of protection of federal officers, since it might be said that the
producers were exercising a federally imposed duty when perform-
ing federal contracts. Such an analysis might extend section 241
to all government contractors.
G. Rights Secured by Federal Laws or Treaties
Very few cases have arisen in which section 241 has been utilized
to prevent interference with rights secured by a statute. The leading
case, however, is United States v. Waddell.40 The defendants were
indicted under section 241 for conspiracy to deprive a citizen of his
right under the Homestead Acts to establish a claim to lands of the
United States. They had tried to prevent him from residing on and
cultivating the land so as to perfect his claim. In an 1884 opinion by
Mr. Justice Miller, the Court upheld this use of section 241. The
victim was clearly exercising a right wholly dependent upon a valid
act of Congress.41 The Court held that whenever a conspiracy at-
tempts to prevent the exercise of rights granted by statute or to oppress
because of the exercise of them, the conspiracy comes within section
241 and the constitutional power of Congress.4
37. Smith v. United States, 157 Fed. 721 (8th Cir. 1907), cert. denied, 208 U.S.
618 (1908).
38. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581, 1583, 1584 (1964).
39. Anderson v. United States, 269 Fed. 65 (9th Cir. 1920), cert. denied, 255
U.S. 576 (1921) (holding indictment sufficient); Haywood v. United States, 268 Fed.
795 (7th Cir. 1920), cert. denied, 256 U.S. 689 (1921) (holding no violation).
40. 112 U.S. 76 (1884).
41. The Constitution gives Congress the power to dispose of and make regulations
concerning United States property. U.S. CONsr. art. IV, § 3.
42. Accord, Nixon v. United States, 289 Fed. 177 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 263 U.S.
703 (1923); Roberts v. United States, 283 Fed. 960 (8th Cir. 1922); Haynes v.
United States, 101 Fed. 817 (8th Cir. 1900).
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It seems, then, that section 241 on its face is applicable to any case
of coercion of a person who has acquired personal rights under a
federal statute, if the purpose of the coercion is to cause him to
renounce his statutory benefits.43 Most such applications of section
241 should pose no problems as to the power of Congress, provided
the right is being exercised under a valid statute.4 4 There is, however,
one major limitation to applying section 241 to rights secured by
statutes: where the particular statute was intended by Congress to
carry no criminal penalty to protect its operation or to have its own
remedial sections as exclusive remedies, then section 241 seemingly
would not apply.
While many authorities feel that section 241 should apply to rights
secured under the National Labor Relations Act and the Fair Labor
Standards Act,45 the case law remains unclear. Indictments filed in
Harlan County, Kentucky, based upon rights secured by the National
Labor Relations Act survived a demurrer, but the jury could not agree
on a verdict.4 6 In United States v. Berke Cake Co.47 a district court
dismissed an indictment based upon rights under the Fair Labor
Standards Act on the ground that the FLSA has its own penalties
which Congress intended to be exclusive. But the court alternatively
based its decision upon the clearly irrelevant ground that the FLSA
has nothing to do with rights deriving from the status of citizenship. 48
And in United States v. Bailes,49 a district court dismissed a prosecu-
tion based upon rights under the National Labor Relations Act,
concluding that Congress intended that the NLRA was not to have
any criminal penalties. Again, the court relied upon a dubious alter-
native ground: the victims supposedly were not exercising a right
wholly dependent upon the NLRA because the right to refrain from
43. See Schweinhaut, The Civil Liberties Section of the Department of Justice, 1
Bi.L oF RIGHTS REv. 206, 210 (1941) (author is the former chief of civil rights
section of Department of Justice); cf. Kouvrrz, THE CONSTrTUON AND CIVIL RIHTs
44 (1947).
44. Where, however, the statute has been passed under the authority of the fourteenth
or fifteenth amendments, the problem of reaching private action through those amend-
ments arises.
45. See, e.g., CARm, FEDERAL PROTEcTION OF Crvm RIGHTS 186-88 (1947); Tom C.
Clark, A Federal Prosecutor Looks at the Civil Rights Statutes, 47 CoLum. L. REv.
175, 181 (1947); Schweinhaut, supra note 43, at 210-11. Prior to the NLRA clearly
there was no federally secured right to join a union. See United States v. Moore, 129
Fed. 630 (C.C.N.D. Ala. 1904).
46. The case is unreported. United States v. Mary Helen Coal Corp., E.D. Ky.,
1938. Further discussion of the case may be found in 1939 Arr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 63;
CARR, op. cit. supra note 45, 27-28; Schweinhaut, supra note 43, at 210-11.
47. 50 F. Supp. 311 (E.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 320 U.S. 807 (1943).
48. See text accompanying notes 59-63 infra. The case is strongly criticized in
CAnm, op. cit. supra note 45, at 186-88. The Government appeal was apparently
dismissed because of a technicality. Ibid.
49. 120 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.W. Va. 1954).
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joining a union was a fundamental right prior to that act.
As early as 1947, Professor Milton Konvitz suggested that if Con-
gress ever passed a Fair Employment Practice Act, section 241 might
protect Negro workers in their rights to hold a job and to promotions.50
Recently, in United States v. Guest,51 the indictment alleged that the
defendants conspired to intimidate Negroes in their rights to equal
enjoyment of public accommodations. The Government contended
that these rights are secured under title 2 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.52 The district court held that the indictment did not sufficiently
allege discrimination based on race and that Congress did not intend
the 1964 Civil Rights Act to impose criminal penalties other than
those specifically provided in the act.5 3 The Supreme Court declined
to review either determination on the ground that the Court lacked
jurisdiction to hear the appeal.54
While section 241 probably protects rights secured by treaties, 5
the Court in Baldwin v. Franks6 dismissed such an indictment because
the victim was not a citizen as required by the terms of section 241.
H. Summary
The Legal Tender Cases57 observed that the necessary and proper
clause was intended to confer upon the Government the power of
self-preservation. Insofar as congressional power is concerned, then,
the cases discussed above are within the implied power of govern-
mental self-protection. The determination in many of these cases,
that the victims were exercising rights secured by the Constitution and
laws of the United States, seems strained. One cannot help but
conclude that it would be preferable for these offenses to be punished
exclusively by statutes more specifically tailored for them. In fact,
such statutes as those dealing with obstruction of justice, protection
of federal officers, and involuntary servitude might well be interpreted
as superseding section 241, especially in view of the lighter penalties
imposed by the more specific statutes.5 8 General, catch-all criminal
50. KONVITZ, op. cit. supra note 43, at 45.
51. 9 RAcE REtL. L. REP. 1692 (M.D. Ga. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 86 Sup.
Ct. 1170 (1966).
52. 78 Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (1964).
53. Section 207(b) of the act provides that the remedies of the act be the exclusive
means of enforcing rights based on the act. 78 Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a)-6(b)
(1964). In Guest the Government argued that the act's civil remedies are made
exclusive only as against proprietors of covered establishments. See Brief for the
United States, pp. 66-72, United States v. Guest, 86 Sup. Ct. 1170 (1966).
54. 86 Sup. Ct. 1170-75 (1966).
55. Cf. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79-80 (1873) (dictum).
56. 120 U.S. 678 (1887).
57. Supra note 8.
58. See notes 35, 23 & 38 supra.
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statutes should be discouraged unless there are strong reasons re-
quiring such legislation.
Although a few lower courts have asserted that section 241 is limited
to rights pertaining to or peculiar to citizenship as such,59 the cases
just discussed refute such a view. In Logan, the Supreme Court
specifically held that the section is not limited to political rights of
citizens;60 and more recently, in United States v. Williams,61 none
of the Justices adopted the lower court view that section 241 is limited
to rights of citizenship.61 The limitation to citizens refers only to the
person who was the object of the conspiracy, not to the particular
right he was exercising. In fact, were it not for the statutory
limitation to citizens, the rights discussed thus far would be likewise
applicable to aliens.63
These rights discussed so far as being protected by section 241 are
too narrow in scope to be of great import in protecting those who are
working for or who are exercising the civil rights of Negroes. Never-
theless, it should be kept in mind that section 241, or the obstruction
of justice statute, or both, protect persons who are filing complaints,
informing of possible violations, or acting as witnesses in those federal
proceedings which relate to civil rights. Particularly, the executive
branch should keep in mind that it has a duty to protect these persons
by using all the powers lawfully conferred upon it. Affirmative protec-
tion, in addition to after-the-fact prosecutions, is required.
III. TnE ELUSIVE RIGHTs oF NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP
The cases we are about to consider are sometimes classified as
involving the rights of national citizenship. This classification, how-
ever, may not be entirely accurate. On closer reflection, some of these
rights do not appear to arise from the status of citizenship as such,
but arise instead from the creation of a republican form of government
and from the need to protect that government by keeping open the
channels of communication between the government and the governed.
Part of the confusion as to rights of national citizenship results from
the indiscriminate interchange of cases involving section 241 and cases
59. See, e.g., United States v. Guest, supra note 51; Haywood v. United States,
supra note 39; United States v. Bailes, supra note 49; United States v. Berke Cake
Co., supra note 47.
60. 144 U.S. 263, 293 (1892); accord, United States v. Patrick, supra note 21. See
Brief for the United States pp. 20-25, United States v. Price, 86 Sup. Ct. 1152 (1966).
61. 341 U.S. 70 (1951), affirming 179 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1950).
62. See Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MicH. L.
Ruv. 1323, 1348 (1952).
63. But see Meyers, Federal Privileges and Immunities: Application to Ingress and
Egress, 29 ComsxrN= L.Q. 489, 496-98 (1944).
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involving the privilege and immunities clause of the fourteenth
amendment, which provides: "No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of
the United States." But some of the privileges under that clause may
be inherently limited to privileges against state action, and thus not
subject to section 241 protection against private invasion. Also, it is
still not clear whether the privileges and immunities clause is limited
to rights peculiar to the status of citizenship, or applies instead to
all those rights "which owe their existence to the Federal government,
its National character, its Constitution, or its laws."6
The net result is that cases decided under the privileges and
immunities clause must be carefully scrutinized to determine their
effect, if any, upon section 241.
A. Right To Vote in Federal Elections
In Ex parte Yarbrough,65 the petitioners had been convicted of
violating section 24166 by conspiring to intimidate a Negro in order
to prevent him, because of his race, from voting in a congressional
election. In an 1884 opinion, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld
the convictions. The Court stated that if the national government,
whose essential character is republican in form, did not have the
power to protect elections from open violence and insidious corruption,
then it would be left helpless before the great historical enemies of
all republics-violence and corruption.67 Just as the national govern-
ment has the implied power to protect the federal treasury and mails
from theft and burglary, and the implied power to protect federal
officers, so has it the power to protect those voting in national elec-
tions. This power, the Court held, arises out of the circumstance
that the function which the voter is about to exercise is dependent
upon the laws of the United States. The national government has
the duty to protect the voter from violence in his exercise of this
right:
This duty does not arise solely from the interest of the party concerned,
but from the necessity of the government itself, that . . . the votes by
which its members of Congress and its President are elected shall be the
free votes of the electors, and the officers thus chosen the free and uncor-
rupted choice of those who have the right to take part in that choice.6 8
64. Slaughter-House Cases, supra note 55, at 79. See generally McGovney, Privileges
or Immunities Clause, Fourteenth Amendment, 4 IowA L. BULL. 219 (1918).
65. Supra note 22.
66. The case also involved RE.v. STAT. § 5520 (1875), which specifically dealt with
conspiracies to interfere with federal elections. This statute was repealed by the Act
of Feb. 8, 1894, ch. 25, § 1, 28 Stat. 37.
67. 110 U.S. at 657-58.
68. Id. at 662.
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Although article I, section 4 gives Congress the power to alter the
times, places, and manner of holding federal elections, the Court
did not attempt to find the power to pass laws protecting the right to
vote in any specific section of the Constitution. Instead, the Court
relied upon the implied power of self-protection:
It is ... essential to the successful working of this government that the
great organisms of its executive and legislative branches should be the
free choice of the people .... In a republican government, like ours, where
political power is reposed in representatives of the entire body of the people,
chosen at short intervals by proper elections, the temptations to control
these elections by violence and by corruption is a constant source of danger.69
But merely finding a federal power over elections is not enough;
section 241 requires that the victim be exercising a right secured to
him by the Constitution or laws of the United States. The Court held
that the right of the people to vote in congressional elections is
secured by the Constitution. Section 2 of article I, for instance, gives
the people the right to vote for members of the House of Representa-
tives, subject to certain qualifications. Thus, while the fifteenth
amendment was designed to confer the right to vote on the Negro,
70
the right of all persons to vote in national elections is likewise secured
by the Constitution.71 The reliance on article I, section 2 indicates
that the Court was not dealing with a right inherent in citizenship
as such, but with a right secured to the people generally under
specific provisions of the Constitution.
7 2
Since the decision in Yarbrough, the protection of section 241 has
been extended to the right to have one's vote counted once it has been
cast 3 and to other election frauds.7 4 In addition, primary elections are
now covered.7 5 Accordingly, section 241 has received its greatest
69. Id. at 666.
70. A recent article has read into the Yarbrough opinion the implication that the
fifteenth amendment is not limited to state action. Note, 74 YALE L.J. 1448, 1454
(1964). But see James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903).
71. Thus the Court by implication rejected the contention made by the Court
nine years earlier in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555-56 (1875) that to
be protected by section 241 the interference with the right to vote must be on account
of race or color.
72. Article I, section 2 makes no reference to citizens. The seventeenth amendment
likewise gives to the people generally the right to vote for Senators. In view of the
electoral system, there might be some doubt as to whether Yarbrough applies to Presi-
dential elections. It would seem, however, that since article II, section 1 requires
the states to select the manner of choosing electors, the body or persons so selected by
the state are exercising a federally secured right when they are choosing electors.
Cf. Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
73. United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915).
74. See, e.g., United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944).
75. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
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use in the voting area, although most of the prosecutions have dealt
with election frauds rather than violence or intimidation.7 6
From the end of Reconstruction until about 1890, Negroes in the
South were disenfranchised on a massive scale by means of threats of
physical violence and economic coercion. During the 1890's Southern
states changed to "legal" methods of keeping Negroes from the polls-
such as the grandfather clause 7 and interpretation tests.78 As the last
of these "legal" barriers are removed by federal legislative and
judicial action, it is reasonable to expect a return to intimidation.
There are already ominous indications that this may be occurring. 9
Although civil remedies would be the most effective method of deal-
ing with economic intimidation,80 section 241 should be a valuable
device for preventing physical violence. The limitation to federal
elections is not a great handicap since most intimidation occurs in con-
nection with registration, which usually qualifies a voter for both
state and federal elections.8'
B. Free Speech and Assembly
By way of dictum, the Supreme Court in the Slaughter-House
76. See 1 E msRsoN & HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
158 (1958). The Hatch Act, 18 U.S.C. § 594 (1964) specifically makes a crime the
intimidation of voters in a federal election, but this section has been only rarely used.
1 id. at 159. Its punishment is only a maximum fine of $1,000, or imprisonment of
not more than one year, or both. A civil action, which may be brought by the United
States, is afforded by 42 U.S.C. § 1971(b) (1964). As to the criminal provisions of
the 1965 Voting Rights Act, see note 200 infra.
77. See Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S.
347 (1915).
78. See Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965); Davis v. Schnell, 81 F.
Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala.), aff'd mem., 336 U.S. 933 (1949).
79. See e.g., United States v. Beaty, 6 RACE REL. L. REP. 201 (6th Cir. 1960),
additional injunction issued, 288 F.2d 653 (6th Cir. 1961), on remand, 7 RAcE REL.
L. REP. 484 (W.D. Tenn. 1962); United States v. Deal, 6 RAcE REL. L. REP. 474
(W.D. La. 1961); U. S. Co ms'N ON CIVIL RIGHTs, Tim VOTING RIGHTS AcT: ThE
FIRST MONTHS 35 (1965); PmcE, THm NEGRO AND THE BALLOT IN THE SOUTi, 21
(1959); Fleming, Resistance Movements and Racial Desegregation, 304 ANNALS 44,
48 (1956); Hamilton, Southern Judges and Negro Voting Rights, 1965 Wis. L. REv.
72, 91-98, 101-02; Comment, 71 YALE L.J. 537 (1962); A Sequel to Segregation, Life,
Dec. 10, 1956, p. 77.
80. What is needed is a swift administrative remedy patterned after the relief afforded
by the National Labor Relations Board. For a discussion of the present civil remedies
see Note, 74 YALE L.J. 1462 (1965).
81. The rationale of Yarbrough should extend that decision to the entire registration
and pre-registration process. See Note, Supra note 80, at 1470 n.45. A federal grand
jury has returned an indictment charging a violation of § 241 by a conspiracy to
interfere with the right to protest unlawful deprivation of the right of Alabama
Negroes to vote and with the right to encourage Negroes to vote. United States v.
Eaton, Crim. No. 11,736N, returned April 6, 1965 (M.D. Ala.). The case arises out
of the murder of Mrs. Viola Liuzzo near Montgomery, Alabama, on March 25, 1965.
See U. S. COMm'N ON CivIL RIGHTS, LAw ENFORcEMENT: A REPORT ON EQUAL
PROTECTION IN THE SOUTH 111-12 (1965).
[ VOL. 19
CIVIL RIGHTS CRIMES
Cases82 undertook to list some of the privileges and immunities of
national citizenship which are protected by the fourteenth amendment.
Included among these was the right to assemble peacefully in order
to petition Congress for redress of grievances. 3 Two years later, in
United States v. Cruikshank the Court passed on the validity of a
complaint charging a violation of section 241 by a conspiracy to
deprive certain Negroes of the right to assemble. After holding that
the general right to assemble peaceably is not a right guaranteed by
the Constitution against private interference, the Court stated this
now-famous dictum:
The right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petition-
ing Congress for a redress of grievances or for anything else connected with
the powers or the duties of the national government is an attribute of
national citizenship, and, as such, under the protection of, and guaranteed
by, the United States. The very idea of a government, republican in form,
implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation
in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances. If it
had been alleged in these counts that the object of the defendants was to
prevent a meeting for such a purpose, the case would have been within the
statute, and within the scope of the sovereignty of the United States. Such,
however, is not the case.85
Until recently only one attempt had been made to use section
241 to carry out the Court's promise. In Powe v. United States,
86
the defendants had been convicted of violating section 241 by con-
spiring to injure a citizen in the free exercise of the right and privilege
to speak and publish his views. The defendants allegedly used black-
mail to prevent a newspaper editor from exposing illegal gambling
and lotteries and from calling upon public officials to suppress these
activities. In reversing the convictions, the Fifth Circuit stated that it
did not doubt that Congress has the impiled power to protect directly
its citizens in their right to assemble peaceably in order to petition
the federal government for redress. But Congress may do so only
because of the necessity to maintain a federal right in its integrity:
Because the federal government is a republican one in which the will of the
people ought to prevail, and because that will ought to be expressive of an
informed public opinion, the freedom of speaking and printing on subjects
relating to that government, its elections, its laws, its operations and its
officers is vital to it.
87
82. Supra note 55.
83. Id. at 79; accord, Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908) (dictum).
84. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
85. Id. at 552-53.
86. 109 F.2d 147 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 679 (1940).
87. Id. at 151.
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The court held, however, that Congress cannot legislate generally to
preserve freedom in discussing religious affairs, social or artistic mat-
ters, or, as here, matters of purely state concern.
88
In 1965, the Justice Department sought and obtained an indictment
charging a violation of section 241 by a conspiracy to interfere with
the right to petition the state government for a redress of grievances."
This allegation, of course, runs contrary to the holding in Powe.
The 1951 Supreme Court case of Collins v. Hardyman90 involved a
civil suit under what is now section 1985(3) of title 42."' The de-
fendants combined to break up by force and threats a meeting called
for the purpose of adopting a resolution to be forwarded to the
appropriate federal officials on a matter under consideration by
Congress. The Ninth Circuit had held that section 1985(3) reached
all constitutionally secured rights and that under the authority of
Cruikshank
a representative government cannot function properly unless its officers are
informed of the opinions and desires of the people whom they represent. To
protect the right to assemble for the purposes alleged in this case is to
keep open those vital channels of communication between government and
the governed.
92
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the Ninth Circuit on the
ground that the civil statute does not protect all federally secured
rights, but only the rights to equal protection and equal privileges
and immunities under the fourteenth amendment. Thus, the majority
of the Court did not reach the constitutional questions of "the first
magnitude" raised by Cruikshank.93 The three dissenting justices were
convinced, however, that the plaintiffs were exercising a federally
created constitutional right.94
Also of interest is Hague v. CIO,9 5 which involved a suit to enjoin
municipal officials from enforcing certain ordinances forbidding the
distribution of printed matter. Of the seven Justices passing on the
case, five were of the opinion that the ordinances were invalid. Those
88. The Government's unsuccessful petition for certiorari suggested that had the
articles and editorials been allowed to continue, they might have had national signifi-
cance in bringing to light violations of federal income tax laws, or other criminal
action forbidden by federal law. See CAuB, op. cit. supra note 45, at 104. Schweinhaut,
supra note 43. This argument apparently was not made before the Fifth Circuit.
89. United States v. Eaton, supra note 81.
90. 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1964).
92. Hardyman v. Collins, 183 F.2d 308, 313 (9th Cir. 1950).
93. 341 U.S. at 659. The majority opinion is criticized in Comment, 46 ILL. L. lnv.
931 (1952).
94. 341 U.S. at 663 (Burton, Black, and Douglas, J.J., dissenting).
95. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
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Justices constituting the majority could not agree as to whether the
enforcement of the ordinances violated the privileges and immunities
clauwe of the fourteenth amendment in addition to the due process
clause. Mr. Justice Roberts, in an opinion in which Mr. Justice Black
joined, stated that the plaintiffs purpose was to disseminate informa-
tion concerning the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act and
to assemble peaceably for discussion of the act and the opportunities
and advantages offered by itY6 Citing the Slaughter-House Cases and
Cruikshank, he observed that the right to assemble and discuss matters
growing out of national legislation is a privilege inherent in citizen-
ship: "Citizenship of the United States would be little better than a
name if it did not carry with it the right to discuss naional legislation
and the benefits, advantages, and opportunities to accrue to citizens
therefrom."97 Thus he concluded that the plaintiff's activities were
protected by the privileges and immunities clause from interference
by the state.
Mr. Justice Stone, in an opinion joined in by Mr. Justice Reed, stated
that freedom of speech and assembly are rights of personal liberty
secured to all persons under the due process clause without regard to
citizenship. Therefore, he concluded, there should be no occasion here
to consider the application of the privileges and immunities clauseB
But he went on to say that, assuming Cruikshank was correct when
it said that the right of a citizen to assemble to petition Congress for
redress is a privilege of United States citizenship, the step is long and
by no means certain that the right to assemble to discuss advantages
of the National Labor Relations Act is such a privilege.9 9 In any case,
he concluded that the record in Hague did not show that this was
the objective of the plaintiffs. In still another opinion, Mr. Chief
Justice Hughes agreed with Mr. Justice Roberts that the right under
discussion was a privilege of a citizen, but he also agreed with Mr.
Justice Stone that the record did not support such a factual determi-
nation in this case.100 Nine years later a majority of the court indi-
cated that they preferred the opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts.'101
As in Yarbrough,102 the emphasis of the court in Powe, and of the
Ninth Circuit in Collins, was on the need to protect the republican
nature of the national government. It is essential to the effective
functioning of our national government that the channels of com-
96. Id. at 512.
97. Id. at 513.
98. Id at 519.
99. Id. at 522. But see the text accompanying note 87 supra, quoting from Powe
v. United States, supra note 86.
100. 307 U.S. 532 (dissent).
101. Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 560-61, 564 (1948).
102. 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
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munication between the government and its people be kept clear
and that the people be able to reach an informed opinion. So it is that
Congress, under the implied power of self-protection, has the power
to pass legislation protecting the freedom to speak and assemble con-
cerning matters of national import. But section 241 requires that
the citizen be exercising a right secured by the Constitution or federal
laws. Perhaps Powe and Collins imply this right by the same reason-
ing which has been suggested in order to imply a right for federal
officers, informers, and litigants: a republican form of government
implies a duty and right in the people to participate in the governing
process, for the government cannot function without such participa-
tion. This, I believe, is the proper approach to these cases. Preferably,
Congress should save the Court the difficulty of such a complicated
analysis by passing a statute specifically exercising this power.
10 3
Under the Powe approach, then, the right is not peculiar to citizen-
ship. Non-citizens are subject to numerous federal laws and regula-
tions, and to effectively govern them the national government must
be able to hear their suggestions and complaints. Section 241,
however, does not exercise the congressional power to protect the
rights of non-citizens.
Cruikshank referred to the right of seeking redress as an "attribute
of national citizenship." But it went on to infer this right, not from
the status of citizenship, but from the "very idea of a government,
republican in form."104 Thus Cruikshank is probably consistent with
the analysis I have suggested. The reference to attributes of national
citizenship no doubt came from the Slaughter-House Cases and the
confusion over whether the privileges and immunities clause is limited
to rights which stem from the creation of the status of citizenship.
Indeed, Hague, decided under that clause, treated the rights in
question as though they were derived solely from the status of national
citizenship.0 5 The significance of the Hague approach is that it could
be an omen of an emerging concept of national citizenship which
views the status of citizenship as being in itself a source of basic
rights for the citizen.
Whatever the theory, the Cruikshank and Powe dicta afford a
significant rationale for bringing many forms of private violence
within reach of the federal criminal jurisdiction. 1°6 The absence of
any effort on the part of the Department of Justice to utilize this
103. See text accompanying note 197 infra.
104. See text accompanying note 85 supra.
105. See text accompanying note 97 supra.
106. KoNvrrz, THE CONsTITUMN AND CrviL RIGHTs 42 (1947); see comment,




doctrine prior to 1965 is surprising.107 The whole tenor of the civil
rights movement in the South since 1954 has been intricately involved
with efforts to procure new federal legislation, to obtain greater
exercise by the executive of existing powers, or to inform Negroes of
their rights under federal laws.
C. Free Movement
Perhaps the most confusing application of section 241 is in the
area of free movement. In 1867, prior to the passage of the fourteenth
amendment, the Supreme Court in Crandall v. Nevada'0 8 held uncon-
stitutional a Nevada tax imposed on every passenger carried out of
the state by railroad. The statute was not struck down because of the
commerce clause, but because it was inconsistent with inherent rights
conferred by the Constitution. The federal government, the Court
held, has the right to bring citizens to its offices to perform services
for it, and the citizen has certain correlative rights along with those of
the national government:
He has the right to come to the seat of government to assert any claim
he may have upon that government, or to transact any business he may
have with it. To seek its protection, to share its offices, to engage in
administering its functions. He has a right to free access to its seaports,
through which all the operations of foreign trade and commerce are con-
ducted, to the sub-treasuries, the land offices, the revenue offices, and the
courts of justice in the several States, and this right is in its nature inde-
pendent of the will of any State over whose soil he must pass in the exercise
of it. 109
Like the right to vote in national elections which was established
in Yarbrough, the right to travel as expressed in Crandall is related to
the need to protect the effective functioning of the national govern-
ment." 0 In fact, Mr. Justice Miller wrote the opinion of the Court
in both Crandall and Yarbrough.
In the Slaughter-House Cases,"' the Court adopted the rights of
travel listed in Crandall as being protected from state interference by
the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The Court added to these the right to become a citizen of any state
by bona fide residence.12 In 1908, Twining v. New Jersey summarized
107. See generally Note, Discretion to Prosecute Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 74
YALE L.J. 1297 (1965).
108. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
109. Id. at 44.
110. But see Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 178-79 (1941) (opinion of
Douglas, J.).
111. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873) (dictum). The opinions in both Crandall
and the Slaughter-House Cases were written by Mr. Justice Miller.
112. Id. at 89.
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by declaring that among the rights and privileges of national citizen-
ship already recognized by the Court was "the right to pass freely
from state to state.""
3
The first attempt to extend the right to travel so as to protect
against private interference was in 1920 in the case of United States
v. Wheeler."4 The defendants in Wheeler were indicted under
section 241 for conspiracy to seize certain citizens and forceably
eject them from the state of Arizona, threatening to harm them if
they tried to re-enter the state."5 The Supreme Court invalidated the
indictments. Most of the opinion revolves around article IV, section
2 of the Constitution, the original privileges and immunities clause,
although the Government expressly disclaimed any reliance on that
provision.116 The Court erroneously assumed that if it found a federal
right not to be ejected from a state, this holding would necessarily
mean that there was an "absence of all state authority to deal with
the individual wrongs complained of."117 This, the Court reasoned,
would violate the reserved power of the state to deal with free
residence, ingress, and egress." 8
Only in the last two paragraphs did the Court approach the real
issues in the case. 1 9 The Court distinguished the Crandall case be-
cause that case involved the validity of state action and because
the state statute there was held to directly burden governmental
functions of the United States, thus limiting the rights of citizens
growing out of such functions. For the same reasons, Twining's state-
ment that the privilege of passing from state to state is an attribute
of national citizenship was passed over as inapposite. The Court
did warn that it was not implying a want of power to restrain acts
involving ingress or egress to or from a state if those acts directly and
necessarily interfere with the performance of the duties incumbent
113. 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908) (dictum); cf. Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274
(1900) (dictum).
114. 254 U.S. 281 (1920) (Opinion by White, C.J.). Mr. Justice Clarke dissented
without opinion. See generally Bowman, The United States Citizen's Privilege of State
Residence, 10 B.U.L. REv. 459 (1930). Wheeler is criticized in Meyers, Federal
Privileges and Immunities: Application to Ingress and Egress, 29 CORNELL L. REv. 489,
505-08 (1944). The author was a member of the Civil Rights Election of the Depart-
ment of Justice.
115. There were apparently political overtones to the deportation, as the case is
sometimes known as the Wobby Deportation Case. See CAmm, FEDFAAL PROTEcTSON
OF Crvm RIHTS 69 (1947). The incident has also been referred to as the Bisbee
Deportation. See United States v. Guest, 86 Sup. Ct. 1170, 1183 n.2 (1966) (Opinion
of Harlan, J.).
116. 254 U.S. at 284 (argument for the United States).
117. Id. at 297. Clearly a right, such as the right to vote in federal elections, may be
protected by both the state and national governments.
118. This reserved power in article IV, section 2 was gleaned from article IV of the
Articles of Confederation.
119. 254 U.S. at 299-300.
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upon the United States to discharge, such as those duties listed in
Crandall.
By 1941, some members of the Supreme Court began to express
doubt as to the conclusions reached in Wheeler. In Edwards 1>.
Califonnia,120 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a California
statute which made it a misdemeanor to bring into the state an
indigent nonresident. Five Justices concluded that the statute was in
violation of the commerce clause and expressed no opinion as to
other clauses of the Constitution. Mr. Justice Douglas' concurring
opinion, in which Justices Black and Murphy joined, concluded, how-
ever, that the statute violated the privileges and immunities clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Following Twining, Mr. Justice Doug-
las stated that the right to move freely from state to state is an
incident of national citizenship protected against state interference
by that clause.' 21 He disagreed with Wheelers conclusion that Cran-
daUll was limited to rights growing out of governmental functions. l'2 In-
stead, the right to travel is an attribute of personal liberty, basic to any
guarantee of freedom of opportunity.'2 3 In a separate concurring
opinion Mr. Justice Jackson agreed that the right of a citizen to
enter any state is a right of citizenship. 24 He pointed out that
because citizenship carries with it the duty to render military service
to defend every part of the United States, it follows that the citizen
must have the right to migrate to any part of this land.' 2- Neither
opinion mentioned what effect private interference would have on this
right of ingress and egress.
In 1964, Mr. Justice Douglas took his opinion in Edwards one
step further. In a separate opinion in Bell v. Maryland,126 in which
he was joined by Mr. Justice Goldberg, he concluded that the right
to be served in places of public accommodation is an incident of
national citizenship which is protected against state action (or state
inaction) by the privileges and immunities clause. He reasoned that
a person's right to travel expressed in Edwards (including intrastate
travel) shrinks in value when there is no accompanying right to eat
in public places: "Certainly his right to eat in public restaurants is
as important in the modem setting as the right of mobility. In these
times that right is, indeed, practically indispensable to travel either
interstate or intrastate."
2 7
120. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
121. Id. at 178.
122. Id. at 178-79.
123. Id. at 179, 181.
124. Id. at 181-86.
125. Id. at 185-86.
126. 378 U.S. 226, 249-52 (1964).
127. Id. at 255. See also his concurring opinon in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
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The Supreme Court in 1966 finally resolved the right to travel
issue in United States v. Guest. 28 In that case the indictment alleged
a criminal conspiracy by private individuals 129 to violate section 241
by injuring, oppressing, threatening, and intimidating Negro citizens
in the free exercise and enjoyment of: "The right to travel freely to
and from the State of Georgia and to use highway facilities and other
instrumentalities of interstate commerce within the State of
Georgia."130 The district court dismissed the indictment, and the
Government appealed.
The majority of the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice
Stewart, held that the indictment alleged a violation of a federally
secured right to travel from one state to another.' 31 The opinion
states that the right to interstate travel "has long been recognized" as
a basic right under the Constitution and that, although there have
been differences within the Court as to the source of the constitutional
right, "all have agreed that the right exists."132 The majority saw
itself as merely "reaffirming" that right.1'
The difficulty with the majority's analysis, however, is that all but
one of the cases cited in the opinion dealt with state interference
with interstate travel. The only exception was United States v.
Moore,'3 in which the Circuit Court for the Northern District of
Alabama held that the right to establish a union was not guaranteed
by the Constitution, and accordingly dismissed a conspiracy indict-
ment against private individuals under section 241. The case was
decided in 1904 prior to federal labor legislation.135 In the course of
his opinion, the district judge undertook to list some of the rights and
privileges secured to citizens of the United States. The majority of
the Supreme Court in Guest was apparently impressed with the
judge's inclusion of "the right to pass from one state to any other
for any lawful purpose."136 Yet, a closer inspection of the district
judge's opinion shows that the dictum might well be limited to state
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 279 (1964) and in New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 12-
14 (1959). See generally CHArEE, TmwE HUMAN BIGHTs iN TH= CONSTITUTON 184-
93 (1956), also discussing state action.
128. 86 Sup. Ct. 1170 (1966).
129. Actually, the Court's decision as to the right to travel free from private inter-
ference was dicta, since the Court found an allegation in the indictment of state action.
See id. at 1187-88 n.1 (concurring opinion of Brennan, J.)
130. Id. at 1177.
131. Five Justices joined in this portion of the opinion. Mr. Justice Harlan dis-
sented, and Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Chief Justice Warren reached the same
result as the majority, but for other reasons.
132. 86 Sup. Ct. 1170, 1179 (1966).
133. Id. at 1179.
134. 129 Fed. 630 (C.C.N.D. Ala. 1904).
135. See generally text accompanying notes 45-49 supra.
136. United States v. Moore, supra note 134, at 633.
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interference with the right to travel, for the right to travel was listed
between the right to equal protection of the laws and the right of a
nonresident not to be subjected to taxes which are not also imposed
on citizens of the taxing state. In short, the majority in Guest was
able to cite no authority clearly supporting its holding that the right
to travel is protected against private interference.
The majority disposed of the Wheeler case in a footnote.137 Mr.
Justice Stewart distinguished Wheeler on the ground that it involved
a conspiracy to compel residents to move out of a state; thus the right
of interstate travel was not directly involved. Nevetheless, he added:
Whatever continuing validity Wheeler may have as restricted to its own
facts, the dicta in the Wheeler opinion relied on by the District Court in the
present case have been discredited in subsequent decisions. Cf. Edwards
v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177, 180 (Douglas, J., concurring); Williams
v. United States, 341 U.S. 70, 80.13
In another footnote, Mr. Justice Stewart answered the dissent by ad-
mitting that the prior cases involved governmental interference with
the right to travel:
The right to interstate travel is a right that the Constitution itself guaran-
tees, as the cases cited in the text make clear. Although these cases in fact
involved governmental interference with the right of free interstate travel,
their reasoning fully supports the conclusion that the constitutional right of
interstate travel is a right secured against interference from any source what-
ever, whether governmental or private.139
In conclusion, the majority opinion indicated that the prosecution
must prove specific intent-that is, that the predominant purpose of
the conspiracy was to impede or prevent the exercise of the right of
interstate travel, or to oppress a person because of his exercise of that
right. Racial motivation, of course, is not required.
In a carefully documented dissent, Mr. Justice Harlan traced the
cases dealing with the privileges and immunities of national citizen-
ship, the commerce clause, and the due process clause. He con-
cluded:
This survey of the various bases for grounding the "right to travel" is
conclusive only to the extent of showing that there has never been an
acknowledged constitutional right to be free from private interference, and
137. 86 Sup. Ct. 1170, 1179 n.16 (1966).
138. Ibid. Of course, Edwards involved state interference and the criticism of
Wheeler was joined in by only three justices. There is nothing in Williams which is
critical of Wheeler. Wheeler, however, was criticized by Meyers, supra note 114, and
its overruling was predicted in CAMru, op. cit. supra note 115, at 64 n.19, 188. Contra,
Note, 53 HAIIv. L. R-v. 1031, 1039 (1940).
139. 86 Sup. Ct. 1170, 1179 n.17 (1966).
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that the right in question has traditionally been seen and applied, whatever
the constitutional underpinning asserted, only against governmental impedi-
ments.140
From a ,policy standpoint, Mr. Justice Harlan concluded that the
few constitutionally created rights which private individuals have
against other private individuals include only those rights which con-
cern important relationships with the federal government. While he
recognized that one can argue that private interference with free
movement interferes with important federal interests, he could not
agree that private interference is a sufficient impediment to free
movement to be analogous to state interference or to sustain a
criminal indictment.
After reviewing the right-to-travel cases, one can reach several
conclusions. First, there is no doubt that Congress has the power to
pass legislation protecting interstate travel from private interference.
Second, it is likewise clear that there is a right to interstate travel free
from state interference. Third, such cases as Logan, Quarles, and
Cruikshank would indicate that anyone traveling on federal business
or in connection with the search for federal redress is exercising a
federally protected right.14  The difficult question is whether there
is a general right to interstate travel free from private interference.
While there is much that can be said for the conclusion reached in
Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent, it is also true that interstate travel today
plays an important role in the functioning of the nation as a whole.
Certainly it cannot be said that the majority opinion in Guest is clearly
wrong.
There are, however, two important defects in that majority opinion.
The first is the Court's apparent retroactive application of a new rule
of law to a crime requiring specific intent. Guest is the first case
holding that the right to interstate travel applies as against private
interference. In Screws v. United States, the Court held that specific
intent under section 242 means specific intent to deprive a person of
a right "which has been made specific either by the express terms
of the Constitution or laws of the United States or by decisions in-
140. Id. at 1185. The only exception might be In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895),
decided under the commerce clause, which permitted an injunction against union
members to prevent them from obstructing interstate commerce and the passage
of the mails. The majority opinion did not rely on Debs.
141. See In re Quarles & Butler, 158 U.S. 532 (1895). Logan v. United States, 144
U.S. 263 (1892); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). The indictment
in Guest could have been based on this ground since the victim was leaving the state
after having gone there pursuant to military duty. Such an indictment, however, would




terpreting them."u 42 Since the same requirement of specific intent
applies to section 241,143 there could have been no specific intent by
the defendants in Guest to interfere with the newly-defined right to
travel. 44 It may well be that the Court did not wish to pass upon
this issue at the pleading stage. 45
The other weakness of Guest stems from the failure of the majority
opinion to specify the source and basis of the right to be free from
private interference with interstate travel. One might well conclude
that this right comes not so much from the need to protect the func-
tions of the national government, but from the fundamental nature
of the right itself. If such an interpretation is correct, then Guest may
be the beginning of the most significant development in constitutional
law since the passage of the fourteenth amendment, for it leads directly
to the fundamental rights theory of national citizenship.
D. The Fundamental Rights Theory of National Citizenship
Once one accepts the premise that there are certain rights against
private acts which are inherent in and which arise solely from the
status of national citizenship, then the problem of defining and lo-
cating these rights arises. Since the emphasis is placed upon the
right of the individual, it is not surprising that some authorities have
predicted and advocated that eventually the Court will and should
recognize that all fundamental rights are rights of national citizenship.
These authorities are far too eminent and the proposition suggested
far too important to be left unanswered.
In 1947, Professor Robert Carr suggested in his book Federal Pro-
tection of Civil Rights that the Supreme Court should read into the
Constitution the principle that our basic civil rights are federal rights,
entitled to protection by the federal government:
It is neither a distortion of constitutional principles nor a perversion of
the purposes of our Constitution to say that in a democratic society citizens
must enjoy basic rights such as freedom to discuss public affairs, and that
the central government must possess sufficient power to protect these rights
-particularly when local governments are unable or unwilling to protect
them.146
142. 325 U.S. 91, 104 (1945); see United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 93-95
(1951) (Opinion of Douglas, J.); United States v. Guest, 86 Sup. Ct. 1170, 1193
(1966) (opinion of Douglas, J.).
143. United States v. Price, 86 Sup. Ct. 1152, 1163 n.20 (1966); United States v.
Guest, 86 Sup. Ct. 1170, 1179 (1966).
144. See James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 221-22 (1961).
145. Cf. United States v. Guest, 86 Cup. Ct. 1170, 1193 (1966) (opinion of
Douglas, J.).
146. CAlm, op. cit. supra note 115, at 204.
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While recognizing that many technical difficulties stand in the way of
such a holding, he felt that the main step forward should be taken
soon and unequivocally.
That same year Professor Milton Konvitz reached a similar conclu-
sion in his book The Constitution and Civil Rights:
41
The time may come when the Supreme Court will consider all the personal
rights protected against federal or state invasion as essential attributes of
national citizenship to be protected against invasion by private individuals
conspiring together, and thus subject to protection under Section 51 [now
section 241]. Such a development would be as natural as has been the
reading into the Fourteenth Amendment, against state infraction, of the
Bill of Bights. 148
The most comprehensive presentation of this position has been
made by Professor Ralph Newman.149 Professor Newman concludes
that the Constitution omitted to define citizenship because the framers
believed that:
[I]t was not necessary to state that citizens of a nation acquire by such
citizenship certain fundamental rights, so broad as to be perhaps incapable
of any closer definition than the statement in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence that all men are entitled to life, liberty and the pursuit of happi-
ness.... The wisdom of the Founding Fathers may have forged a mightier
weapon than we knew; ready at hand to make possible the satisfaction of
society's changing needs. 150
Professor Newman does not agree that section 241 should be limited
to rights which relate directly to the needs of the functioning of the
federal government: "Rights of citizenship, it would seem, should
be regarded as more than grease for the wheels of the machinery of
government."
5 1
Professor Newman is undoubtedly correct when he states that, ff
there are any rights of national citizenship, Congress has the implied
power to protect these rights. He is also correct in asserting that the
Constitution may not only give rise to implied powers, but also implied
rights such as certain rights of citizenship. The difficulty is in implying
such sweeping rights from the mere creation of citizenship. Did not
the Founding Fathers assume (perhaps too optimistically) that the
147. KoNvrrz, THE CoNsTrnMoN AND CIVIL BIGHrs 42-44, 87-88 (1947).
148. Id. at 42.
149. See NEwmAN & NvMAN, THE ROLE OF LAWV IN SocErY 307-13 (1958);
Newman, A Forgotten Right of United States Citizenship, 39 ILL. L. REv. 367 (1945).
150. NEWmA & NmvE'MA, op. cit. supra note 149, 307. Some of the funda-
mental rights he lists are the right to life or property, vote for local officials, education,
economic or social security, health, decent housing, and work for a living. Id. at 309.
151. Newman, supra note 149, at 377.
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states would adequately ensure these fundamental rights for their
own citizens?
Professor Newman presents strong policy reasons for unlimited
federal power in this area. The national government, he reasons,
already has virtually unlimited power through the commerce clause
and other powers. Using the power based upon rights of national
citizenship permits greater sincerity in the method by which our
national goals may be pursued. Modem society, he concludes, re-
quires full power in the nation to assist in the attainment of our
social goals.
It is important to note that Professor Newman is not reviving the
argument that the privileges and immunities clause creates new rights
of national citizenship, including those formerly protected only against
the national government in the Bill of Rights; instead, he believes the
fundamental rights of citizenship were created at the time of the
founding of the nation. Nor does he believe that these rights exist
solely as against state action-that is, he would say that a citizen has
a right to be safe as to his person, not that a citizen merely has a
right to be protected by the state as to his person. The proposition
that the Constitution grants to national citizens the right to be free
from state interference with fundamental rights would not be sur-
prising, for today it poses no new infringement to our federal system.
The due process clause has already granted this right to all persons,
whether citizens or not. But Professor Newman wants federal power
over individual interference, although he admits that this national
power need only be invoked as a supplement to state protection when
the state protection is unsatisfactory. This limitation, however, is
only a voluntary one. Section 241, as it now reads, would invoke the
full federal power in all instances of conspiracies to deprive citizens
of life, liberty, or property. In short, punishment of all criminal con-
spiracies could accrue to the federal authorities.
Despite the desirable efficiency of federal control in these areas
either now or in the future, would it be proper for the Supreme Court
to make this significant change in our federal system? It would seem
that the present situation is not so drastic as to require the circum-
venting of the amending process. Presently-existing powers, if per-
sistently and vigorously employed, should be adequate. It is doubtful
that the Guest case indicates an immediate acceptance of the funda-
mental rights theory; rather the trend will probably be toward a
broader interpretation of the fourteenth amendment.
IV. THEF Four N AiN FrFEENTH AMENDmmNTs
We now turn to the question of when can the fourteenth and
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fifteenth amendments serve as a basis for the use of section 241 to
punish acts of private individuals who are not state officers.
In United States v. Williams,152 decided in 1951, the Supreme
Court was evenly divided on the question of whether, as a matter
of statutory construction, section 241 applies rights secured by the
fourteenth amendment. Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote the opinion
which concluded that Congress did not intend section 241 to apply
to conspiracies by persons acting under color of law for the purpose
of denying rights guaranteed under the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments. 15 Mr. Justice Douglas wrote the dissenting opinion.
The question was again before the Court in the recent case of
United States v. Price,M in which the Court unanimously rejected Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Williams. Relying on the plain lan-
guage of the statute and its legislative history, the Court concluded
that section 241 applies to all constitutional rights, including those
guaranteed by the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. The Court's
conclusion is clearly correct.
A. Direct Interference With the State's Performance of
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment Duties
Many cases state that as a general proposition the fourteenth and
fifteenth amendments do not reach wrongful acts of individuals. 155
Even within the generally accepted view that these amendments im-
pose duties only upon the states, this proposition is not entirely correct.
Not only are private persons sometimes considered as acting under
color of law, 56 but there are instances when these amendments furnish
the power to reach acts of persons who need not be acting under
color of law.
The due process and equal protection clauses create a right-duty
relationship between the individual and the state.157 The individual
152. 341 U.S. 70 (1951). Justices Frankfurter, Vinson, Jackson, and Minton were
against the application of the section. Justices Douglas, Reed, Burton, and Clark favored
the use of the section. The deciding vote was cast by Mr. Justice Black on res judicata
grounds without reaching the merits.
153. The Frankfurter opinion is criticized in Gessman, The Unhappy History of
Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MicH. L. Rzv. 1323, 1348-49 (1952).
154. 86 Sup. Ct. 1152 (1966).
155. See, e.g., Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 14 (1906); Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
156. See, e.g., Hale, Rights Under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
Against Injuries Inflicted by Private Individuals, 6 LAw. GoueD REv. 627 (1946);
Note, 61 HAIv. L. REv. 344 (1948).
157. It is asserted in 43 VA. L. REv. 255 (1957), that the fourteenth amendment
imposes no duty upon the states to desegregate or provide equal protection of the laws,
but merely provides the national government with a negative check on the states.
Such a limited interpretation of that amendment is surely contrary to such cases as
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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has a federally secured right that the state will not deprive him of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor deprive him
of equal protection of the laws. No private person, unless acting under
color of law, can deprive an individual of these rights by acting directly
against him. But we have already seen how the implied power of self-
protection gives Congress the power to protect against all interfer-
ence with federally secured rights and duties. Insofar as private
persons act directly on the state by means of encouraging, intimidat-
ing, threatening, or coercing the state to breach its fourteenth and
fifteenth amendment duties to the people, the national government
has the implied power to prevent this interference. 1m
Brewer v. Hoxie School District 59 supports the suggested analysis.
In that case, school officials brought suit for an injunction against
private parties to prevent them from interfering with the plaintiff's
desegregation of schools. The Eighth Circuit granted the injunction:
Plaintiffs are under a duty to obey the Constitution. Const. Art. VI, cl.
2. They are bound by oath or affirmation to support it and are mindful of
their obligation. It follows as a necesary corollary that they have a federal
right to be free from direct and deliberate interference with the perform-
ance of the constitutionally imposed duty. The right arises by necessary
implication from the imposition of the duty as clearly as though it had been
specifically stated in the Constitution. 160
The existence of a Constitutional duty, the court continued, pre-
supposes a correlative constitutional right in the person for whom
the duty is exercised-a right to be free from direct interference with
the state's performance of the duty. The Court pointed out that the
right does not arise solely from the interest of the parties, but from
the necessity of the government itself. Although the fourteenth amend-
ment is concerned with state action, the court reasoned that if the
defendants' illegal conduct should succeed in coercing the school
158. See 70 HARv. L. REv. 1299 (1957). Not only is the necessary and proper clause
applicable to the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, but sections 5 and 2, res-
pectively of these amendments give Congress additional enforcement power. A bill
recently introduced in Congress would punish the intimidation of a public official for
the purpose of discouraging him from affording equal protection of the laws to others.
S. 3296, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 501 (c) (1966).
159. 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956); 70 HAnv. L. REV. 1299 (1957).
160. Brewer v. Hoxie School District, supra note 159, at 99. In United States v.
Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883), the Supreme Court struck down a statute (REv. STAT.
§ 5519 (1875) which made it a crime for private persons to conspire to deprive
others of equal protection of the laws. Although another clause punished the pre-
venting or hindering of state authorities from giving or securing equal protection, the
Court did not discuss this seemingly valid clause. Since most Reconstruction statutes
were considered unseverable, the Court probably saw no reason for discussion. Cf.,
e.g., United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875).
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board to rescind its desegregation order, such rescission could be ac-
complished only through "state action."
This doctrine is significant in the civil rights area. It permits section
241 to be used to prevent members of such racist organizations as the
Ku Klux Klan from attempting to control the actions of local officials.''
Even an indirect attempt to control the local government may be
sufficient, for the majority of the Supreme Court in Collins v. Hardy-
man162 noted:
We do not say that no conspiracy by private individuals could be of such
magnitude and effect as to work a deprivation of equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privilege and immunities under the laws. Indeed, the
post-Civil War Ku Klux Klan, against which this act [42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)]
was fashioned, may have, or may reasonably have been thought to have
done so. It is estimated to have had a membership of around 550,000, and
thus to have included "nearly the entire adult male white population of the
South." It may well be that a conspiracy, so farfiung and embracing such
numbers, with a purpose to dominate and set at naught the "carpetbag"
and "scalowag" governments of the day, was able effectively to deprive
Negroes of their legal rights and to close all avenues of redress or vindica-
tion, in view of the then disparity of position, education and opportunity
between them and the Ku Klux Klan. We do not know.
1 63
B. Conspiracies Consisting of Both Private Individuals
and State Officers
Conspiracy cases present an interesting application of the theory
that private persons acting against the state may be punished through
the implied power of Congress to protect fourteenth and fifteenth
amendment rights. A number of cases, including the Price case, have
held that private persons who conspire with state officers are punish-
able by the federal government. 64 Price treated the private persons
161. This was probably one of the major objectives of section 241. See historical
materials cited in United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 76-77 nn.3 & 4, 90-91 n.3
(1951) and the appendix to United States v. Price, 86 Sup. Ct. 1152, 1163-70 (1966).
162. 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
163. Id. at 662. Compare Powe v. United States, 109 F.2d 147 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 309 U.S. 679 (1940). Pointing to article IV, section 4, which provides that
the United States shall guarantee to every state a republican form of government, the
Court in Powe observed: "Should a tyranny be set up in a State accompanied by a
suppression of free speech and press, conceivably the Congress might be called on,
temporarily in the execution of this guaranty, to pass a law securing against individual
violence free speech in such state; but the section before us is not such a law."
Id. at 151.
164. See United States v. Price, 86 Sup. Ct. 1152 (1966); Brown v. United States, 204
F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1953); Culp v. United States, 131 F.2d 93 (8th Cir. 1942);
United States v. Lynch, 94 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ga. 1950), aff'd on other grounds,
189 F.2d 476 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 831 (1951); United States v. Trier-
weiler, 52 F. Supp. 4 (E.D. Mich. 1943).
[ VOL. 19
CIVIL RIGHTS CRIMES
as acting "under color of law."165 Other cases, however, have indi-
cated that the private parties are not themselves acting under color
of law, but are nevertheless liable as abettors. 1' In Price, the Court did
not reach the question of whether the private individuals might also
be abettors.
67
C. Due Process: Lynchings
The idea that the fourteenth amendment applies to acts of private
individuals which interfere with a state's furnishing of due process
was the subject of considerable discussion during the 1940's because an
effort was being made to find some way of dealing with the then-
prevalent lynchings. Victor Rotnem, a former chief of the Civil
Rights Section of the Department of Justice, suggested that a state
prisoner has a due process right to a fair trial and to have the state
court's determination reviewed by the federal courts in light of the due
process clause. 68 Therefore, when a mob takes a state prisoner from
custody and lynches him, they deprive the prisoner of his federally
secured right to a fair trial and interfere with the administration of
federal justice, constituting a violation of section 241.169
The first case to reach the Supreme Court involving the lynching
of a state prisoner was United States v. Harris.170 But the Court there
was merely concerned with whether private individuals can deprive
others of equal protection of the laws; there was no discussion of due
process or the peculiar facts before the Court.171 In Ex parte Rig-
gins,172 a section 241 prosecution for a lynching conspiracy, a district
judge applied the reasoning suggested by Mr. Rotnem. The judge
observed that when the state seeks to punish a citizen for a crime, it
must afford him the opportunity to appear before a lawful tribunal.
To do so, the state must safely keep him, and any state officer so en-
165. 86 Sup. Ct. 1152, 1156-57 (1966); accord, United States v. Lynch, supra note
164; Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280, 298 (9th Cir. 1959) (applying civil section
1983(3)); Baldwin v. Morgan, 251 F.2d 780 (5th Cir. 1958) (same).
166. See Brown v. United States, supra note 164; Culp v. United States, supra note
164; United States v. Price, supra note 164; United States v. Trierweiler, supra note
164.
167. 86 Sup. Ct. 1152, 1158 (1966). The Government argued both theories in the
alternative. Brief for the United States, pp. 28-36.
168. Rotnem, The Federal Right "Not to be Lynched," 28 WAsH. U.L.Q. 57 (1943).
169. Accord, CARR, FEDERAL PROTECON OF CmVIL liGrrs 165-73 (1947).
Kom='Z, op. cit. supra note 147, at 84-88; Coleman, Freedom from Fear on the Home
Front, 29 IowA L. B.Ev. 415 (1944) (author Special Assistant to the Attorney Gen-
eral); Note, 2 GFo. WAsH. L. BEv. 498, 501-02 (1934). Contra, Note, 34 VA. L. B.v.
944 (1948); Comment, 57 YAE L.J. 855, 870-71 (1948).
170. 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
171. See note 160 supra; Fraenkel, The Federal Civil Rights Laws, 31 MmN. L. Bxv.
301, 318 n.100 (1947).




gaged is performing a function which the fourteenth amendment
commands him to perform. Only three years later, however, the
same district judge had a similar case before him in United States
v. Powell,173 and he felt compelled to dismiss the indictments because
he believed that dicta in the intervening Supreme Court case of
Hodges v. United States 74 constituted a rejection of his opinion in
Riggins. Oddly enough, Hodges was not a lynching case and was
primarily concerned with the thirteenth amendment. The only state-
ment in that opinion relevant to the fourteenth amendment was one
sentence of dictum to the effect that the amendment relates to state
action.175 The Supreme Court affirmed PowellJ 76 without opinion,
merely citing Hodges.
The weakness of Riggins and the Rotnem approach is the assumption
that a prisoner, validly in custody and awaiting trial, has an already
accrued constitutional right to a trial. The due process clause pro-
vides: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." A state does not breach this
clause when it releases a validly held prisoner before trial, because
it has already furnished due process of law for the pre-trial detention
and has no obligation to furnish a trial unless it intends to further
deprive the accused of life, liberty, or property. Without a depriva-
tion of life, liberty, or property by the State, there is no obligation
to provide due process of law. By the same token a mob does not
interfere with any constitutionally accrued right to a fair trial unless
that mob can be said to be acting as the state itself.
By the substitution of one simple step in the reasoning process,
however, the Riggins and Rotnem approach has some validity. One
merely need conclude that due process requires that, for any state to
incarcerate an accused, whether before or after trial, it must make
every reasonable effort to protect him from private persons who seek
to take the law into their own hands.177 Surely due process requires
this much of the custodian of a person who is thereby made helpless
to defend himself. If due process requires the state to protect the
prisoner, then the doctrine of Brewer would say that if members of the
lynch mob act against state officers and hinder them in their perform-
ance of this duty, those members of the mob have violated section 241.
The number of lynchings-that is, the forceable taking of a suspected
173. 151 Fed. 648 (C.C.N.D. Ala. 1907), aff'd per curiam, 212 U.S. 564 (1909).
174. 203 U.S. 1 (1906).
175. Id. at 14.
176. 212 U.S. 564 (1909). Another attempt was made to employ the Riggins
approach in a 1942 Sikeston, Missouri, lynching case, but the grand jury failed to issue
any indictments. CAm, op. cit. supra note 169, at 169-70; Coleman, supra note 169;
See Rotnem, supra note 168.
177. See Recent Statute, 38 CoLuM,. L. REv. 199, 203-04 (1938).
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criminal or a prisoner who is in police custody and killing him under
the pretext of serving "justice"-have steadily declined to the point
where there have been few reported lynchings in recent years.1 73
Unfortunately, this does not mean that racial violence has decreased.
On the contrary, in the past few years there has been an alarming
increase in the number of civil rights related killings'79 and acts of
violence'80 in the South. Absent state involvement, however, the due
process clause as utilized in section 241 would seem to offer little help
in these cases.
D. Equal Protection: The "Guest" Case
In United States v. Guest,'8' the defendants, all private individuals,
were indicted for conspiring to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimi-
date Negro ciitzens in the free exercise and enjoyment of:
The right to the equal utilization, without discrimination upon the basis
of race, of public facilities in the vicinity of Athens, Georgia, owned, operated
or managed by or on behalf of the State of Georgia or any subdivision
thereof.18
Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, held that section 241
is merely remedial and incorporates no more than the equal protection
clause itself. He reaffirmed that "ights under the equal protection
clause itself arise only where there has been involvement of the State
or of one acting under the color of its authority."18 The involvement
of the state, he added, may be peripheral, and need be neither
exclusive nor direct.
The majority, however, saw no reason to explore the threshold level
of state action. One of the means of accomplishing the object of the
conspiracy, according to the allegations of the indictment, was by
"causing the arrest of Negroes by means of false reports that such
178. See U.S. CoWDXn'N ON CIvIL RiG-Irs, LAw ENFORCEMENT: A REPORT ON EQUAL
PRoTEcnoN IN THE SouTH 11-12 (1965); 1 EMERSON & HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL
IGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (2d ed. 1958). Between 1881 and 1960 some
3,441 Negroes were lynched in the United States. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, op.
cit. supra at 11.
179. On Jan. 30, 1966, the Southern Regional Council released the following statistics
on civil rights related killings of both Negroes and whites in the South during the past
decade: 1956-7; 1957-3; 1958-9; 1959-4; 1960-6; 1961-3; 1962-4; 1963-13;
1964-14; 1965-17. Civil Liberties, March 1966, p. 6.
180. See UNITED STATES COnv'N ON CIVIL BaG=I, op. cit. supra note 178, at 12-13.
In the summer of 1964 alone, reports were received of racial violence in Mississippi
totaling 35 shootings, 30 bombings, 35 church burnings, 80 beatings, and at least 6
murders. Id. at 13.
181. 86 Sup. Ct. 1170 (1966).
182. Id. at 1175.
183. Ibid.
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Negroes had committed criminal acts."184 Contrary to the argument
of the litigants, the majority held that this allegation was broad
enough to cover a charge of active connivance by state officers, and
thus upheld the indictment.
Justices Stewart, White and Harlan declined to express any opinion
as to what legislation Congress might be empowered to enact under
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. Mr. Justice Clark, in an
opinion in which Justices Black and Fortas joined, agreed with Mr.
Justice Stewart's disposition of the equal protection issue, but felt
compelled to add by way of dictum that "there now can be no doubt
that the specific language of section 5 empowers the Congress to enact
laws punishing all conspiracies-with or without state action-that in-
terfere with Fourteenth Amendment rights."18 Mr. Justice Clark did
not elaborate on what these rights may be, but he did indicate that
one such right is "the right to utilize public facilities."186
Mr. Justice Brennan, in an opinion in which Chief Justice Warren
and Mr. Justice Douglas joined, indicated that he would uphold the
indictment on different grounds than did the majority. In his view, the
equal protection clause creates a right to use state facilities without
discrimination based upon race, although the terms of the clause
protect that right only as against state action. Section 5 of the amend-
ment, however, empowers Congress to pass legislation protecting
that right from private interference. Up to this point, Mr. Justice
Brennan's approach seems to be the majority view of the Court, since
Mr. Justice Clark's opinion expresses apparent agreement. Mr. Justice
Brennan was in the minority, however, in concluding that section 241
is such legislation under section 5 of the amendment.
The majority view, as expressed by the opinions of Justices Brennan
and Clark, is based upon the assumption that the fourteenth amend-
ment creates a "right to equal utilization of state facilities"; thus
section 5 of the amendment grants Congress power to protect that
right from private interference. The closest Mr. Justice Brennan comes
to defining the source of the right is in the following statement:
The Fourteenth Amendment commands the State to provide the members
of all races with equal access to public facilities it owns or manages, and the
right of a citizen to use those facilities without discrimination on the basis
of race is a basic corollary of this command. 187
But the majority assume their conclusion as part of their basic
184. I& at 1177.
185. Id. at 1180. Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment provides: "The Congress
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
186. Ibid.
187. Id. at 1190.
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premise. They start with the proposition that there is a right to use
state facilities without discrimination based upon race, when actually
they are saying that there is a right to use state facilities without racial
discrimination from any quarter-state or private. The traditional
view of the equal protection clause is that it creates a right to be
free of discrimination by the state. So defined, the right can only be
infringed by state action, and legislation under section 5 must be
directed at that infringement. Unfortunately, neither the Brennan nor
the Clark opinion directly confronts this traditional approach.
The majority could have found support in the Logan case.188 In
that case, the Court found that a governmental duty to protect a
person gave rise to a right in that person as against private individuals,
although in Logan there was no problem as to congressional power.18 9
The majority view has particularly broad implications if carried
over into the due process area. Reasoning by analogy, the due process
clause grants a right not to be denied life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, although the clause itself only protects that right
from state interference. Section 5 would give Congress the power to
protect the right to life, liberty, and property from private interference
-that is, Congress could pass an entire criminal code extending to all
crimes. It is doubtful, however, that a majority of the present Court
would consent to suh a sweeping change in the federal system.
The majority also left unanswered the problem of congressional
power under section 5 to deal with racial discrimination in privately
owned facilities. Both the opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas and the
Brief of the United States recognized the significance of the fact that
the facilities in Guest were state facilities.190 Although the trend
toward establishing federal power over discrimination in privately
owned facilities may already be in the making, the Court will have to
afford a more lucid discussion of the problem than it did in Guest
if it is to find such a power.
V. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
Section 241 has proved to be an important tool in the develop-
ment of American constitutional law. It has helped crystallize the
implied power of self-protection, and has brought to light individual
rights which otherwise might have remained unrecognized. But the
section-hurriedly passed' 9' as part of a comprehensive legislative
188. 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
189. See text accompanying notes 11-18 supra.
190. 86 Sup. Ct. at 1190; Brief of the United States, pp. 20-21.




plan, the rest of which has long been repealed-is in dire need of
revision.
The only substantial improvement to the section in the last 95 years
has been the removal of the penalty of disqualification from public
office, which had proven to be an obstacle to obtaining convictions. 9 '
Other relatively minor changes which have been suggested are the
imposition of liability on one person who is not acting as part of a
conspiracy, and the expansion of the protection to all persons, whether
citizens or not.193 Both of these recommendations are commendable.
Section 241 requires more substantial changes, however, if it is to
become an effective weapon against civil rights crimes. Change is
particularly needed in the section's penalty provisions. The present
statute makes no distinction between various types of intimidation-
murder calls for no greater penalty than does economic coercion.
The result is that there is too light a penalty for the more severe acts
of violence, and so great a penalty for the subtler means of intimida-
tion that Southern juries are reluctant to find the defendants guilty.
Any revision of section 241, then, should include a graded scale of
penalties.19
A broad criminal statute whose coverage is vague and unclear is
never desirable, even though its constitutionality is protected by a
requirement of specific intent. Lack of specificity undermines the
deterrent effect of the statute and hinders officers charged with its
enforcement. The statute should be sufficiently clear that an agent
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation can determine whether he is
witnessing a federal crime without having to obtain a legal opinion
from the Department of Justice.195 Moreover, in its present form
section 241 is saved from being void for vagueness only because of
a stringent requirement of specific intent. The United States Com-
mission on Civil Rights has concluded that the most serious limitation
192. The change was made at the time of the 1948 revision of the Code (Act of
June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 696) at the suggestion of the President's Committee
on Civil Rights. See U.S. PREIsmENT'S COMAITrEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, To SECURE
TEsE RIGHT-s 156 (1947).
193. Ibid. See CAem, op. cit. supra note 169, at 208; Comment, 57 YALE L.J. 855,
867 (1948). Bills which would have made these improvements have apparently failed
because of the Southern block. See, e.g., S. 508, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
194. Such a revision is included in S. 3296, H.R. 14765, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 501,
502 (a) (1966). See also the President's message which accompanied the introduction
of these bills, H.R. Doe. No. 432, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in 112 CONG.
REc. 8955, 8956 (daily ed. April 28, 1966).
195. When complaints are made to the FBI of section 241 crimes, the agents
currently are under standing instructions to transmit them to the Civil Rights Division
of the Justice Department for evaluation. Agents are not permitted to make on-the-scene




on the effectiveness of section 241 is the pecific intent requirement. 196
In his concurring opinion in the Guest case, Mr. Justice Brennan like-
wise recognized this defect and suggested that Congress make the
statute more definite in scope.'97
The time has come for Congress to repeal section 241 and replace
it with a statute specifically enumerating categories of criminal con-
duct. 98 Congress should exclude from this list rights which are
adequately protected by other criminal statutes, 99 or rights which are
no longer of sufficient importance to warrant protection by criminal
laws. 200 Added to the list should be activities not previously covered
by section 241, but which are within the federal criminal powers.
Perhaps the most difficult problem Congress will face in drafting new
legislation will be the problem of specific intent. A lack of any
intent requirement might well extend the statute's coverage far beyond
what Congress considers the federal interest. On the other hand, the
difficulty of proving a particular intent could destroy the usefulness
of the statute. Balancing these considerations will be a difficult task.
Some of the provisions which might be included in a statute re-
placing section 241 are listed below:
1. Protection of Federal Prisoners.-Congress should consider mak-
ing a federal offense any act of violence against a person in federal
penal custody, if the act occurs on other than government property.
Crimes on federal property should already be covered by present
legislation. Of course, there should be no requirement of specific
intent in this provision.
2. Informers.-It should be a crime to intimidate any person to
prevent him from giving information to federal authorities of viola-
tions of federal laws, or to intimidate him because of his having done
so. In this instance, the requirement of specific intent is clearly justi-
fied.
3. Labor Relations.-The courts have never decided whether section
241 applies to rights under the National Labor Relations Act or Fair
Labor Standards Act. On repealing section 241, Congress should
reconsider whether those acts ought to be amended to provide criminal
sanctions.
196. Id. at 110-12, 175-76.
197. Supra note 181, at 1192-93.
198. Accord, CARa, op. cit. supra note 169, at 206-07. Contra, Comment, 57 YALE:
L.J. 855, 867 (1948).
199. For instance, protection against involuntary servitude and protection of federal
officers, litigants and witnesses are all adequately covered by other criminal statutes.
See notes 23, 35 & 38, supra.
200. Congress might well omit protection of furnishers of war supplies and pro-
tection of homesteaders.
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4. The 1964 Civil Rights Act.-Congress should definitely amend the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 in order to establish criminal penalties for
intimidation of any person in his exercise of, or because of his having
exercised, rights granted in the public accommodations and equal
employment titles of the act. Congress would be justified in exempting
from these criminal sanctions nonviolent acts of the owners and
operators of the particular business involved, on the theory that civil
remedies will provide more effective enforcement of the statute.
Attempts, however, to coerce businessmen to violate the act might well
be made subject to the criminal provisions.
5. Voting.-Unfortunately, the criminal section of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965201 was poorly drafted and there is a great deal of con-
fusion over its scope.202 Congress could replace section 241 with a
provision aimed at federal elections, or it might attempt to reach both
federal and state elections under the powers conferred by section 2
of the fifteenth amendment. The latter would be a logical extension
of the dictum of the majority in Guest relating to section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment.
20 3
6. Free Speech and Assembly.-Legislation is definitely needed
making it a crime to interfere with the freedom to assemble, speak,
and print about subjects relating to the national government, its
elections, laws, operations, and officers. Such legislation is particularly
desirable in view of the strong feelings presently being generated
by United States foreign policy.
7. State Officers Performing Constitutionally Required Duties.-
It should be a crime to interfere with or impede any state officer in the
carrying out of his constitutional duty to (a) desegregate public
schools and facilities, (b) protect prisoners in his custody, and
(c) otherwise provide equal protection of the laws. The statute
should require specific intent in view of the narrow purpose of the
201. Sec. 11 (b): "No person, whether acting under color of law or otherwise, shall
intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce, any
person for voting or attempting to vote, or intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or attempt to
intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for urging or aiding any person to vote or
attempt to vote, or intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for exercising any powers
or duties under section 3(a), 6, 8, 9, 10 or 12(c)."
202. Compare Christopher, The Constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
18 STAN. L. REv. 1, 19 (1965), with Note, 74 YALE L.J. 1448, 1459-60 n.79 (1965).
203. See also Note, The Strange Career of "State Action" Under the Fifteenth
Amendment, 74 YALE L.J. 1448 (1965). An administration sponsored bill now pending
in Congress would remove the criminal penalties from section 11 (b) of the Voting
Rights Act, supra note 201, and would substitute instead a penalty for any racially
motivated interference with voting in either federal or state elections. S. 3296, H.R.
14765, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 501 (a) (1), 502 (c) (1966).
[ VOL. 19
CIVIL RIGHTS CRIMES
section (and in order to avoid any problem of vagueness as to the
latter provision).
8. Interstate Commerce.-One of the most important sections, as
far as civil rights crimes are concerned, would be the one based upon
the commerce clause. This section would cover acts of violence upon
any person who is directly or indirectly using the facilities of or travel-
ing in interstate commerce, or whose assailant uses any facility of
interstate commerce or anything which has moved in interstate com-
merce. The difficult problem is in finding a way to limit the opera-
tion of the section to civil rights connected crimes without imposing
too onerous a burden of proof as to specific ifitent. The United
States Commission on Civil Rights has recommended that there be
no requirement of specific intent and that the statute apply to acts
against a person engaging in certain protected activities, such as
the lawful exercise (or attempted exercise) of any right created or secured
by a Federal statute relating to equal or civil rights, or any peaceful and
orderly activities which is protected by the amendment, when undertaken for
the purpose of obtaining equality for individuals of a particular race or
color.204
To provide effective coverage, however, the statute should apply to
persons who have engaged in or intend to engage in the protected
activities. Thus the statute would apply to numerous non-civil rights
connected crimes. One bill which has been introduced would apply
criminal sanctions when "the purpose or reasonably foreseeable effect"
of the violence is to prevent any person or class of persons from exer-
cising or advocating equal rights or opportunities free from discrimina-
tion on grounds of race or color, or to intimidate them in these activi-
ties.205 This provision likewise has some overlap in coverage since any
killing, whether racially motivated or not, of a person active in civil
rights matters would have the "reasonably foreseeable effect" of pre-
venting future activities. A compromise might be to make the statute
applicable to an assailant whose motive, in whole or in part, was
related to the victim's race or to the victim's attitudes or activities
with respect to such rights or opportunities.20 6 Hopefully, this require-
ment of specific intent would not be too difficult to meet.
9. Equal Use of Public Facilities.-Either instead of or in addition
to the section based upon the commerce clause, Congress could take
advantage of the invitation of a majority of the Supreme Court in
204. Supra note 178, at 177-78.
205. S. 2923, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 207 (a) (3) (1966).
206. This is the approach taken by H.R. 13323, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 201 (1966),
and S. 3296, H.R. 14765, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 501 (1966).
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Guest in order to pass legislation based on section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment.2 7 This section would protect equal use of public facil-
ities. The problem of specific intent would be the same as in the
section based upon the commerce clause.
At the time of this writing the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1966
is pending before Congress. 20 8 Title V of that bill deals with private
interference with civil rights:
Sec. 501. Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, by force or
threat of force-
(a) injures, intimidates, or interferes with, or attempts to injure, intimi-
date, or interfere with any person because of his race, color, religion, or
national origin while he is engaging or seeking to engage in
(1) voting or qualifying to vote in any primary, special or general elec-
tion;
(2) enrolling in or attending any public school or public college;
(3) participating in or enjoying any benefit, service, privilege, program,
facility, or activity provided or administered by the United States or by any
State or subdivision thereof;
(4) applying for or enjoying employment or any prerequisites thereof, by
any private employer or agency of the United States or any State or subdivi-
sion thereof, or of joining or using the services or advantages of any labor
organization or using the service of any employment agency;
(5) selling, purchasing, renting, leasing, occupying, or contracting or
negotiating for the sale, rental, lease, or occupation of any dwelling;
(6) serving or attending upon any court in connection with possible ser-
vice, as a grand or petit juror in any court of the United States or of any
State;
(7) using any vehicle, terminal, or facility of any common carrier by
motor, rail, water, or air;
(8) participating in or enjoying the benefits of any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance; or
(9) enjoying the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which
provides lodging to transient guests, or of any restaurant, cafeteria, lunch-
room, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility principally engaged in
selling food for consumption on the premises, or of any gasoline station, or
of any motion picture house, theater, concert ball, sports arena, stadium,
or any other place of exhibition or entertainment, or of any other establish-
ment which serves the public and which is located within the premises of
207. This new power should eliminate the necessity of some of the wilder schemes
which were previously drawn up in order to obtain federal jurisdiction. One such
bill provided prosecution in and "removal' to federal courts of certain criminal cases.
Much like the Voting Rights Act of 1965, jurisdiction would have been based upon
various denials of equal protection by the state to members of the victim's race, along
with conclusive presumptions in some circumstances. The Attorney General would have
had complete and unreviewable discretion as to when to prosecute and jurisdiction could
not have been questioned in post-conviction proceedings. See S. 2923, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. §§ 201-04 (1966).
208. S. 3296, H.R. 14765, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
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any of the aforesaid establishments or within the premises of which is
physically located any of the aforesaid establishments; or
(b) injures, intimidates, or interferes with, or attempts to injure, intimi-
date, or interfere with any person (1) to discourage such person or any other
person or any class of persons from participating or seeking to participate in
any such benefits or activities without discrimination on account of race,
color, religion, or national origin, or (2) because he has so participated or
sought to so participate, or urged or aided others to so participate, or en-
gaged in speech or peaceful assembly opposing any denial of the opportu-
nity to so participate; or
(c) injures, intimidates, interferes with, or attempts to injure, intimidate,
or interfere with any public official or other person to discourage him from
affording another person or any class of persons equal treatment in partici-
pating or seeking to participate in any of such benefits or activities without
discrimination on account of race, color, religion, or national origin, or be-
cause he has afforded another person or class of persons equal treatment in
so participating or seeking to so participate-
Shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one
year, or both; and if bodily injury results shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results
shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
Amendments
Sec. 502. (a) Section 241 of Title 18, United States Code, is amended
by striking out the final paragraph thereof and substituting the following:
'They shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
10 years, or both; and if death results, they shall be subject to imprisonment
for any term of years or for life.'
(b) Section 242 of Title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking
out the period as the end thereof and adding the following: '; and if death
results shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for life.'
(c) Subsections (a) and (c) of section 12 of the Voting Rights Act of
1965 (79 Stat. 443, 444) are amended by striking out the words 'or (b)'
following the words '11(a).'
The bill is commendable in that it specifically enumerates the pro-
tected activities and offers a graded scale of penalties. In addition,
it skillfully meets the problem of specific intent. Subsection 501(a)
merely requires racial motivation; there need be no intent to interfere
with the protected activities. Presumably, these activities were
selected to provide a constitutional basis for punishing as many racially
motivated crimes as possible-for example, clause (4) protects all
persons who are enjoying employment, clause (5) protects all persons
who are occupying a dwelling, clauses (3) and (8) protect those
participating in federal programs. There may be some problem,
however, in determining whether the bill is intended to apply to all
victims who are employed or live in dwellings, or instead is intended
to be limited to crimes connected with the employment or dwelling.
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As an alternative, subsection 501(b) requires specific intent to inter-
fere with the particular rights.
Despite the lack of attention this title has received, it raises several
important constitutional issues. Clause (5), like title IV of the bill,
applies to all dwellings; clause (4) applies to all employments, not
just those affecting interstate commerce; and clause (9) applies to all
restaurants and places of entertainment, whether or not they affect
commerce. Thus, clauses (4) and (9) would greatly expand the
coverage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by way of criminal remedies,
while leaving that statute intact insofar as its administrative proce-
dures are concerned. Besides this inconsistency, these clauses also
raise constitutional problems. As already discussed in this article, the
Guest case did not pass on whether Congress can use the fourteenth
amendment to enact legislation dealing with private facilities. Accord-
ingly, if passed, the bill and its ensuing litigation might well forge
significant new ground in this country's constitutional development.
One final criticism: subsection 502(a) leaves intact the present
section 241, presumably as a companion conspiracy statute to section
501 of the bill. Thus the problems presented by the vague, uncertain
coverage of section 241 would remain with us.
Of course, there are inherent limitations on the effectiveness of
any criminal remedy.2 9 In those areas of the country where there
is the greatest likelihood of racial violence against Negroes or civil
rights workers, there is the greatest difficulty in obtaining convictions
against the perpetrators. But this does not mean that no such prose-
cutions should be brought.210 There is good reason to believe that the
mere attempt to obtain a conviction tends to have a sobering influence
on local attitudes and practices,211 and that the national publicity
accompanying such a trial has a further deterrent effect. Moreover,
such prosecutions indicate to the Negro federal concern over his wel-
fare, encouraging him to face the physical and economic hazards
barring the exercise of his rights. Not only should the Government
make full use of whatever criminal remedies are available, but it should
also attempt to prevent these crimes before they are committed.
Despite the problems the 1966 Civil Rights Act might raise if
passed, that act, if given vigorous enforcement and conscientious
jurors, would go a long way toward ending one of the most frighten-
ing and shameful chapters in American history. That end has been
a long time in coming-too long for those who have already given
their lives.
209. See Schweinhaut, The Civil Liberties Section of the Department of Justice, 1
BnLL OF BIGHTS REV. 206 (1941).
210. See generally Note, Discretion to Prosecute Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 74
YALE L.J. 1297 (1965).
211. See U.S. PRESIDENT'S Co fnn-lF ON CIVIL iznrs, op. cit. supra note 192, at
126; C.uui, op. cit. supra note 169, at 171, 175-76.
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